{ "batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "articles": [ { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_consent_definition", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] What 'consent' means in US federal NCII law", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The TAKE IT DOWN Act defines consent, for the purposes of the federal criminal NCII/digital-forgery offence at 47 U.S.C. 223(h), as an affirmative, conscious and voluntary authorisation free from force, fraud, duress, misrepresentation or coercion. Silence, acquiescence or a pre-existing relationship is not within the definition on its face.", "body": "The TAKE IT DOWN Act defines consent, for the purposes of the federal criminal NCII/digital-forgery offence at 47 U.S.C. 223(h), as an affirmative, conscious and voluntary authorisation free from force, fraud, duress, misrepresentation or coercion. Silence, acquiescence or a pre-existing relationship is not within the definition on its face.\n\nWhat U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12) actually says:\n\n“The term `consent' means an affirmative, conscious, and voluntary authorization made by an individual free from force, fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or coercion.”\n\nNote: Enacted 19 May 2025 as Pub. L. 119-12, s.2, inserting new subsection (h) into s.223 of the Communications Act of 1934. Note the near-identical but NOT identical definition in 15 U.S.C. 6851(a)(2), which omits 'duress'.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ12/PLAW-119publ12.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12)", "evidence_quote": "The term `consent' means an affirmative, conscious, and voluntary authorization made by an individual free from force, fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or coercion.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent", "topic": "What 'consent' means in US federal NCII law", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_consent_layers", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Consent to creation is not consent to publication", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Federal criminal law expressly separates consent to the creation of an intimate visual depiction from consent to its publication, and separates private disclosure to one person from consent to onward publication. Both are rules of construction binding on the court.", "body": "Federal criminal law expressly separates consent to the creation of an intimate visual depiction from consent to its publication, and separates private disclosure to one person from consent to onward publication. Both are rules of construction binding on the court.\n\nWhat U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12) actually says:\n\n“the fact that the identifiable individual provided consent for the creation of the intimate visual depiction shall not establish that the individual provided consent for the publication of the intimate visual depiction”\n\nNote: 47 U.S.C. 223(h)(5)(A). Subparagraph (B) adds that disclosure of the depiction to another individual does not establish consent to publication. This is the clearest single statement in US federal law that consent is layered.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ12/PLAW-119publ12.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12)", "evidence_quote": "the fact that the identifiable individual provided consent for the creation of the intimate visual depiction shall not establish that the individual provided consent for the publication of the intimate visual depiction", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent", "topic": "Consent to creation is not consent to publication", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_civil_consent_layers", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Same consent-layering rule in the federal civil cause of action", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The federal civil cause of action for disclosure of intimate images applies the same rule: consent to creation does not establish consent to distribution, and disclosure to one person does not establish consent to further disclosure.", "body": "The federal civil cause of action for disclosure of intimate images applies the same rule: consent to creation does not establish consent to distribution, and disclosure to one person does not establish consent to further disclosure.\n\nWhat Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives actually says:\n\n“the fact that the individual consented to the creation of the depiction shall not establish that the person consented to its distribution”\n\nNote: 15 U.S.C. 6851(b)(2)(A), enacted by Pub. L. 117-103, div. W, title XIII, s.1309 (VAWA Reauthorization Act of 2022). The page states the text contains laws in effect on 26 August 2026.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-section6851&num=0&edition=prelim", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives", "evidence_quote": "the fact that the individual consented to the creation of the depiction shall not establish that the person consented to its distribution", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent", "topic": "Same consent-layering rule in the federal civil cause of action", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_civil_remedy", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] NCII: Federal civil remedy: $150,000 liquidated damages", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] An individual whose intimate visual depiction is disclosed without consent, by a person who knows or recklessly disregards the absence of consent, may sue in federal district court and recover actual damages or liquidated damages of $150,000 plus fees and costs, and may obtain injunctive relief and pseudonymity.", "body": "An individual whose intimate visual depiction is disclosed without consent, by a person who knows or recklessly disregards the absence of consent, may sue in federal district court and recover actual damages or liquidated damages of $150,000 plus fees and costs, and may obtain injunctive relief and pseudonymity.\n\nWhat Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives actually says:\n\n“an individual may recover the actual damages sustained by the individual or liquidated damages in the amount of $150,000, and the cost of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred”\n\nNote: 15 U.S.C. 6851(b)(3)(A)(i). Whether this section reaches a wholly synthetic depiction is not settled on the face of the text: the definition at 6851(a)(5) requires a 'visual depiction ... that depicts the uncovered genitals ... of an identifiable individual', which is drafted around a real body. Recorded separately as contested.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-section6851&num=0&edition=prelim", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives", "evidence_quote": "an individual may recover the actual damages sustained by the individual or liquidated damages in the amount of $150,000, and the cost of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "NCII", "topic": "Federal civil remedy: $150,000 liquidated damages", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_civil_synthetic_scope", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] NCII: Whether the federal civil action reaches synthetic imagery is unsettled", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The definition of 'intimate visual depiction' in the federal civil statute is drafted around what is actually depicted of an identifiable individual, and the statute contains no equivalent of the criminal statute's separate 'digital forgery' offence. Whether a face-swapped or AI-generated depiction falls within it is not resolved on the face of the text.", "body": "The definition of 'intimate visual depiction' in the federal civil statute is drafted around what is actually depicted of an identifiable individual, and the statute contains no equivalent of the criminal statute's separate 'digital forgery' offence. Whether a face-swapped or AI-generated depiction falls within it is not resolved on the face of the text.\n\nWhat Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives actually says:\n\n“The term \"intimate visual depiction\"- (A) means a visual depiction, as that term is defined in section 2256(5) of title 18, that depicts- (i) the uncovered genitals, pubic area, anus, or post-pubescent female nipple of an identifiable individual”\n\nNote: 15 U.S.C. 6851(a)(5)(A). I found no case law on this point in this session and did not search case databases; treat as an open question, not as a conclusion. The federal bill intended to close this gap (the DEFIANCE Act) could not be status-checked - see could_not_verify.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title15-section6851&num=0&edition=prelim", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives", "evidence_quote": "The term \"intimate visual depiction\"- (A) means a visual depiction, as that term is defined in section 2256(5) of title 18, that depicts- (i) the uncovered genitals, pubic area, anus, or post-pubescent female nipple of an identifiable individual", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "NCII", "topic": "Whether the federal civil action reaches synthetic imagery is unsettled", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_synthetic_digital_forgery_definition", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Synthetic imagery: What counts as a 'digital forgery' federally", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Federal criminal law defines 'digital forgery' to cover an intimate visual depiction of an identifiable individual made by software, machine learning or AI, INCLUDING by adapting, modifying, manipulating or altering an authentic depiction, where a reasonable person viewing it as a whole cannot distinguish it from an authentic depiction of that individual.", "body": "Federal criminal law defines 'digital forgery' to cover an intimate visual depiction of an identifiable individual made by software, machine learning or AI, INCLUDING by adapting, modifying, manipulating or altering an authentic depiction, where a reasonable person viewing it as a whole cannot distinguish it from an authentic depiction of that individual.\n\nWhat U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12) actually says:\n\n“The term `digital forgery' means any intimate visual depiction of an identifiable individual created through the use of software, machine learning, artificial intelligence, or any other computer-generated or technological means, including by adapting, modifying, manipulating, or altering an authentic visual depiction, that, when viewed as a whole by a reasonable person, is indistinguishable from an authentic visual depiction of the individual.”\n\nNote: 47 U.S.C. 223(h)(1)(B). The 'indistinguishable ... from an authentic visual depiction of the individual' test is the pivot: a synthetic face that does not resemble any real person cannot be indistinguishable from an authentic depiction OF an individual.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ12/PLAW-119publ12.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12)", "evidence_quote": "The term `digital forgery' means any intimate visual depiction of an identifiable individual created through the use of software, machine learning, artificial intelligence, or any other computer-generated or technological means, including by adapting, modifying, manipulating, or altering an authentic visual depiction, that, when viewed as a whole by a reasonable person, is indistinguishable from an authentic visual depiction of the individual.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "synthetic imagery", "topic": "What counts as a 'digital forgery' federally", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_synthetic_whose_consent", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Whose consent the federal offence turns on when the face is synthetic", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The federal digital-forgery offence is keyed to an 'identifiable individual', defined as someone who appears in whole or in part in the depiction AND whose face, likeness or other distinguishing characteristic is displayed in connection with it. The consent that matters is that of the person the image is of or appears to be of.", "body": "The federal digital-forgery offence is keyed to an 'identifiable individual', defined as someone who appears in whole or in part in the depiction AND whose face, likeness or other distinguishing characteristic is displayed in connection with it. The consent that matters is that of the person the image is of or appears to be of.\n\nWhat U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12) actually says:\n\n“The term `identifiable individual' means an individual-- (i) who appears in whole or in part in an intimate visual depiction; and (ii) whose face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic (including a unique birthmark or other recognizable feature) is displayed in connection with such intimate visual depiction.”\n\nNote: 47 U.S.C. 223(h)(1)(C). Note 'in whole or in part' and 'other distinguishing characteristic': a real body with a synthetic face can still make the BODY'S owner an identifiable individual if a distinguishing feature (tattoo, birthmark, scar) is displayed. That cuts both ways for IMAGO's core use case.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ12/PLAW-119publ12.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12)", "evidence_quote": "The term `identifiable individual' means an individual-- (i) who appears in whole or in part in an intimate visual depiction; and (ii) whose face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic (including a unique birthmark or other recognizable feature) is displayed in connection with such intimate visual depiction.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent", "topic": "Whose consent the federal offence turns on when the face is synthetic", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_self_depiction_exception", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Consent: Express carve-out for publishing a digital forgery of oneself", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The federal digital-forgery offence expressly does not apply to a person who possesses or publishes a digital forgery of himself or herself engaged in nudity or sexually explicit conduct. The parallel carve-out exists for authentic depictions.", "body": "The federal digital-forgery offence expressly does not apply to a person who possesses or publishes a digital forgery of himself or herself engaged in nudity or sexually explicit conduct. The parallel carve-out exists for authentic depictions.\n\nWhat U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12) actually says:\n\n“a person who possesses or publishes a digital forgery of himself or herself engaged in nudity or sexually explicit conduct (as that term is defined in section 2256(2)(A) of title 18, United States Code)”\n\nNote: 47 U.S.C. 223(h)(3)(C)(iv). This is the provision most directly on point for a creator putting a synthetic face over their own real body: it is their own body, and the exception is drafted in terms of a forgery 'of himself or herself'. The exception is silent on the case where the synthetic face resembles a third party - see law.us.federal.synthetic.whose-consent.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ12/PLAW-119publ12.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12)", "evidence_quote": "a person who possesses or publishes a digital forgery of himself or herself engaged in nudity or sexually explicit conduct (as that term is defined in section 2256(2)(A) of title 18, United States Code)", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent", "topic": "Express carve-out for publishing a digital forgery of oneself", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_ncii_offence", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Federal criminal offence: publishing NCII and digital forgeries", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] It is a federal crime to use an interactive computer service in interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly publish a digital forgery of a non-minor identifiable individual where it was published without consent, was not voluntarily exposed in a public or commercial setting, is not a matter of public concern, and publication is intended to cause harm or does cause harm. Maximum penalty for adult-victim offences is 2 years.", "body": "It is a federal crime to use an interactive computer service in interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly publish a digital forgery of a non-minor identifiable individual where it was published without consent, was not voluntarily exposed in a public or commercial setting, is not a matter of public concern, and publication is intended to cause harm or does cause harm. Maximum penalty for adult-victim offences is 2 years.\n\nWhat U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12) actually says:\n\n“it shall be unlawful for any person, in interstate or foreign commerce, to use an interactive computer service to knowingly publish a digital forgery of an identifiable individual who is not a minor if-- (i) the digital forgery was published without the consent of the identifiable individual; (ii) what is depicted was not voluntarily exposed by the identifiable individual in a public or commercial setting; (iii) what is depicted is not a matter of public concern; and (iv) publication of the digital forgery-- (I) is intended to cause harm; or (II) causes harm, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, to the identifiable individual.”\n\nNote: 47 U.S.C. 223(h)(3)(A). Penalties at 223(h)(4)(A): 'Any person who violates paragraph (2)(A) or (3)(A) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.' Minor-victim offences carry 3 years, 223(h)(4)(B). Threats carry 18 months (adults) / 30 months (minors) for forgeries, 223(h)(6)(B). Forfeiture of 'any personal property ... used, or intended to be used ... to commit or to facilitate the commission of the violation' at 223(h)(7)(A)(iii). Section 2 of the Act had no delayed effective date; the criminal provisions took effect on enactment.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ12/PLAW-119publ12.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12)", "evidence_quote": "it shall be unlawful for any person, in interstate or foreign commerce, to use an interactive computer service to knowingly publish a digital forgery of an identifiable individual who is not a minor if-- (i) the digital forgery was published without the consent of the identifiable individual; (ii) what is depicted was not voluntarily exposed by the identifiable individual in a public or commercial setting; (iii) what is depicted is not a matter of public concern; and (iv) publication of the digital forgery-- (I) is intended to cause harm; or (II) causes harm, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, to the identifiable individual.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "NCII", "topic": "Federal criminal offence: publishing NCII and digital forgeries", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_platform_notice_removal", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] 48-hour notice-and-removal duty on covered platforms", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] A covered platform must operate a notice-and-removal process for nonconsensual intimate visual depictions, must give clear and conspicuous plain-language notice of it, and on a valid request must remove the depiction and make reasonable efforts to identify and remove known identical copies within 48 hours. Good-faith removal is protected from liability.", "body": "A covered platform must operate a notice-and-removal process for nonconsensual intimate visual depictions, must give clear and conspicuous plain-language notice of it, and on a valid request must remove the depiction and make reasonable efforts to identify and remove known identical copies within 48 hours. Good-faith removal is protected from liability.\n\nWhat U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12) actually says:\n\n“a covered platform shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 48 hours after receiving such request-- (A) remove the intimate visual depiction; and (B) make reasonable efforts to identify and remove any known identical copies of such depiction.”\n\nNote: TAKE IT DOWN Act s.3(a)(3). The establishment deadline was 'Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment', i.e. 19 May 2026. Section 3(a)(4) protects good-faith removal. Enforcement is by the FTC as an unfair or deceptive act or practice, s.3(b)(1).", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ12/PLAW-119publ12.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12)", "evidence_quote": "a covered platform shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 48 hours after receiving such request-- (A) remove the intimate visual depiction; and (B) make reasonable efforts to identify and remove any known identical copies of such depiction.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "platform duty", "topic": "48-hour notice-and-removal duty on covered platforms", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_platform_covered_definition", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] What is a 'covered platform' - and whether desktop software is one", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] 'Covered platform' is defined as a website, online service, online application or mobile application that serves the public and either primarily provides a forum for user-generated content, or in the regular course of business publishes, curates, hosts or makes available nonconsensual intimate visual depictions. The definition is framed around hosting or making content available, not around producing tools.", "body": "'Covered platform' is defined as a website, online service, online application or mobile application that serves the public and either primarily provides a forum for user-generated content, or in the regular course of business publishes, curates, hosts or makes available nonconsensual intimate visual depictions. The definition is framed around hosting or making content available, not around producing tools.\n\nWhat U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12) actually says:\n\n“The term ``covered platform'' means a website, online service, online application, or mobile application-- (i) that serves the public; and (ii)(I) that primarily provides a forum for user-generated content, including messages, videos, images, games, and audio files; or (II) for which it is in the regular course of trade or business of the website, online service, online application, or mobile application to publish, curate, host, or make available content of nonconsensual intimate visual depictions.”\n\nNote: TAKE IT DOWN Act s.4(3)(A). I found no authority in this session applying this definition to a desktop application that processes content locally and does not host it. Whether a downloadable desktop tool is an 'online application' is not resolved by the text I read; do not treat the absence of coverage as established.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ12/PLAW-119publ12.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Congress / Government Publishing Office (Public Law 119-12)", "evidence_quote": "The term ``covered platform'' means a website, online service, online application, or mobile application-- (i) that serves the public; and (ii)(I) that primarily provides a forum for user-generated content, including messages, videos, images, games, and audio files; or (II) for which it is in the regular course of trade or business of the website, online service, online application, or mobile application to publish, curate, host, or make available content of nonconsensual intimate visual depictions.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "platform duty", "topic": "What is a 'covered platform' - and whether desktop software is one", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_reg_us_ftc_tida_enforcement", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Platform duty: FTC enforcement of the TAKE IT DOWN Act from 19 May 2026", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The FTC's published business guidance states that Section 3 of the Act is effective 19 May 2026, that covered platforms include social media, messaging, image or video sharing and gaming platforms, that the Act covers digital forgeries as well as real imagery, that protections are not limited to account holders, and that violations may carry civil penalties of $53,088 per violation.", "body": "The FTC's published business guidance states that Section 3 of the Act is effective 19 May 2026, that covered platforms include social media, messaging, image or video sharing and gaming platforms, that the Act covers digital forgeries as well as real imagery, that protections are not limited to account holders, and that violations may carry civil penalties of $53,088 per violation.\n\nWhat U.S. Federal Trade Commission actually says:\n\n“Be advised that a violation of the Take It Down Act is treated as a violation of an FTC rule. Platforms that violate the law may face FTC enforcement that could result in civil penalties of $53,088 per violation.”\n\nNote: Page marked 'May 2026', last modified 8 May 2026. The FTC also states: 'TIDA covers nonconsensual intimate real photos and videos as well as “digital forgeries,” such as images that were digitally created or altered using software, an app, or artificial intelligence.' It recommends hashing and sharing hashes with StopNCII.org for adults. The penalty figure is inflation-adjusted and will change.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/complying-take-it-down-act", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Federal Trade Commission", "evidence_quote": "Be advised that a violation of the Take It Down Act is treated as a violation of an FTC rule. Platforms that violate the law may face FTC enforcement that could result in civil penalties of $53,088 per violation.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "platform duty", "topic": "FTC enforcement of the TAKE IT DOWN Act from 19 May 2026", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_minors_synthetic_hardline", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Synthetic imagery of minors: no real child required", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The federal definition of child pornography expressly includes a computer-generated image that is indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and any depiction created, adapted or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in such conduct. An 'identifiable minor' need not be actually identified.", "body": "The federal definition of child pornography expressly includes a computer-generated image that is indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and any depiction created, adapted or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in such conduct. An 'identifiable minor' need not be actually identified.\n\nWhat U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2024 Edition) actually says:\n\n“(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”\n\nNote: 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(B)-(C); 'identifiable minor' at 2256(9); 'indistinguishable' at 2256(11) (excludes drawings, cartoons, sculptures and paintings). This is the hardest line a face-swap tool can cross: a synthetic face that reads as under-18 on an adult body is squarely within (8)(B)/(C) on the face of the statute. The TAKE IT DOWN Act expressly does not displace this - 47 U.S.C. 223(h)(9).", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap110-sec2256.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2024 Edition)", "evidence_quote": "(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "synthetic imagery", "topic": "Synthetic imagery of minors: no real child required", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_minors_synthetic_obscenity", "category": "Safety", "title": "Obscene synthetic depictions of minors: the minor need not exist", "summary": "18 U.S.C. 1466A criminalises producing, distributing, receiving or possessing with intent to distribute obscene visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and states expressly that it is not an element of the offence that the depicted minor actually exist.", "body": "18 U.S.C. 1466A criminalises producing, distributing, receiving or possessing with intent to distribute obscene visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and states expressly that it is not an element of the offence that the depicted minor actually exist.\n\nWhat U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2024 Edition) actually says:\n\n“It is not a required element of any offense under this section that the minor depicted actually exist.”\n\nNote: 18 U.S.C. 1466A(c). 'Visual depiction' at 1466A(f)(1) expressly includes 'computer generated image or picture'. Penalties are those of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b).", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap71-sec1466A.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2024 Edition)", "evidence_quote": "It is not a required element of any offense under this section that the minor depicted actually exist.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "synthetic imagery", "topic": "Obscene synthetic depictions of minors: the minor need not exist", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ny_consent_documentation", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Consent documentation: New York: what a release must actually contain", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Under New York Civil Rights Law s.52-c, a depicted individual can only consent to the creation, disclosure, dissemination or publication of sexually explicit material by knowingly and voluntarily SIGNING an agreement, written in PLAIN LANGUAGE, that contains a general description of the sexually explicit material AND of the audiovisual work in which it will be incorporated. A generic or blanket release does not satisfy the section as drafted.", "body": "Under New York Civil Rights Law s.52-c, a depicted individual can only consent to the creation, disclosure, dissemination or publication of sexually explicit material by knowingly and voluntarily SIGNING an agreement, written in PLAIN LANGUAGE, that contains a general description of the sexually explicit material AND of the audiovisual work in which it will be incorporated. A generic or blanket release does not satisfy the section as drafted.\n\nWhat New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation actually says:\n\n“A depicted individual may only consent to the creation, disclosure, dissemination, or publication of sexually explicit material by knowingly and voluntarily signing an agreement written in plain language that includes a general description of the sexually explicit material and the audiovisual work in which it will be incorporated.”\n\nNote: N.Y. Civ. Rights Law s.52-c(3)(a). Page states 'Viewing most recent revision (from 2024-05-03)'. This is the single most concrete statutory statement I found in any jurisdiction of what a release must contain. The section is drafted around DIGITIZATION - see the definition at 52-c(1)(b) - so it bites specifically on synthetic and altered material.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVR/52-C", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation", "evidence_quote": "A depicted individual may only consent to the creation, disclosure, dissemination, or publication of sexually explicit material by knowingly and voluntarily signing an agreement written in plain language that includes a general description of the sexually explicit material and the audiovisual work in which it will be incorporated.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent documentation", "topic": "New York: what a release must actually contain", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "failed", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap", "deferred_state_uncorroborated:us-ny" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ny_consent_revocation", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Revocation: New York: a three-business-day right to rescind consent", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] A depicted individual may rescind consent by delivering written notice within three business days of giving it, unless either they were given at least three business days to review the agreement before signing, or their attorney, talent agent or personal manager gave additional written approval of the signed agreement.", "body": "A depicted individual may rescind consent by delivering written notice within three business days of giving it, unless either they were given at least three business days to review the agreement before signing, or their attorney, talent agent or personal manager gave additional written approval of the signed agreement.\n\nWhat New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation actually says:\n\n“A depicted individual may rescind consent by delivering written notice within three business days from the date consent was given to the person in whose favor consent was made, unless one of the following requirements is satisfied: i. the depicted individual is given at least three business days to review the terms of the agreement before signing it; or ii. if the depicted individual is represented, the attorney, talent agent, or personal manager authorized to represent the depicted individual provides additional written approval of the signed agreement.”\n\nNote: N.Y. Civ. Rights Law s.52-c(3)(b). This is a cooling-off right, not a general post-publication withdrawal right. I found no US provision in this session giving a general right to withdraw consent after lawful publication of sexual content. Contrast UK/EU data-protection law, where consent to PROCESSING of personal data is withdrawable at any time - see law.uk.gdpr.consent.withdrawal - which is a different legal object from consent to publication.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVR/52-C", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation", "evidence_quote": "A depicted individual may rescind consent by delivering written notice within three business days from the date consent was given to the person in whose favor consent was made, unless one of the following requirements is satisfied: i. the depicted individual is given at least three business days to review the terms of the agreement before signing it; or ii. if the depicted individual is represented, the attorney, talent agent, or personal manager authorized to represent the depicted individual provides additional written approval of the signed agreement.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "revocation", "topic": "New York: a three-business-day right to rescind consent", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "failed", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap", "deferred_state_uncorroborated:us-ny" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ny_disclaimer_no_defence", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Labelling: New York: an 'this is AI / not real' disclaimer is not a defence", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] It is expressly not a defence to the New York cause of action that the sexually explicit material carries a disclaimer stating that the depicted individual's inclusion was unauthorised or that they did not participate in creating it.", "body": "It is expressly not a defence to the New York cause of action that the sexually explicit material carries a disclaimer stating that the depicted individual's inclusion was unauthorised or that they did not participate in creating it.\n\nWhat New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation actually says:\n\n“It shall not be a defense to an action under this section that there is a disclaimer in the sexually explicit material that communicates that the inclusion of the depicted individual in the sexually explicit material was unauthorized or that the depicted individual did not participate in the creation or development of the material.”\n\nNote: N.Y. Civ. Rights Law s.52-c(2)(b). Directly relevant to any design assumption that watermarking or labelling output as synthetic cures a consent problem. It does not, in New York.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVR/52-C", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation", "evidence_quote": "It shall not be a defense to an action under this section that there is a disclaimer in the sexually explicit material that communicates that the inclusion of the depicted individual in the sexually explicit material was unauthorized or that the depicted individual did not participate in the creation or development of the material.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "labelling", "topic": "New York: an 'this is AI / not real' disclaimer is not a defence", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "failed", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap", "deferred_state_uncorroborated:us-ny" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ny_digitization_definition", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Synthetic imagery: New York: 'digitization' expressly covers AI face/body substitution", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] New York defines 'digitization' to include realistically depicting another human being's nude body parts, or computer-generated nude body parts, as those of the depicted individual, and expressly includes the use of software, machine learning or AI, including by adapting, modifying, manipulating or altering a realistic depiction.", "body": "New York defines 'digitization' to include realistically depicting another human being's nude body parts, or computer-generated nude body parts, as those of the depicted individual, and expressly includes the use of software, machine learning or AI, including by adapting, modifying, manipulating or altering a realistic depiction.\n\nWhat New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation actually says:\n\n“\"digitization\" means to realistically depict the nude body parts of another human being as the nude body parts of the depicted individual, computer-generated nude body parts as the nude body parts of the depicted individual or the depicted individual engaging in sexual conduct, as defined in subdivision ten of section 130.00 of the penal law, in which the depicted individual did not engage.”\n\nNote: N.Y. Civ. Rights Law s.52-c(1)(b). Note the direction of travel: the section protects the person whose LIKENESS is transplanted onto someone else's body. s.52-c(10) preserves 47 U.S.C. 230 as it stands.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVR/52-C", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation", "evidence_quote": "\"digitization\" means to realistically depict the nude body parts of another human being as the nude body parts of the depicted individual, computer-generated nude body parts as the nude body parts of the depicted individual or the depicted individual engaging in sexual conduct, as defined in subdivision ten of section 130.00 of the penal law, in which the depicted individual did not engage.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "synthetic imagery", "topic": "New York: 'digitization' expressly covers AI face/body substitution", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "failed", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap", "deferred_state_uncorroborated:us-ny" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ny_likeness_written_consent", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] New York: written consent required for commercial use of a likeness", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Separately from the NCII provisions, New York gives a statutory action to any person whose name, portrait, picture, likeness or voice is used in the state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without written consent first obtained, with injunctive relief, damages, and exemplary damages where the use was knowing.", "body": "Separately from the NCII provisions, New York gives a statutory action to any person whose name, portrait, picture, likeness or voice is used in the state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without written consent first obtained, with injunctive relief, damages, and exemplary damages where the use was knowing.\n\nWhat New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation actually says:\n\n“Any person whose name, portrait, picture, likeness or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using such person's name, portrait, picture, likeness or voice, to prevent and restrain the use thereof”\n\nNote: N.Y. Civ. Rights Law s.51. This is the classic model-release baseline: it is a WRITTEN consent requirement and it attaches to 'likeness', which is the operative concept when a synthetic face resembles a real person. The cross-referenced consent requirement sits in s.50, which I did not open.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVR/51", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "New York State Senate, NYS Open Legislation", "evidence_quote": "Any person whose name, portrait, picture, likeness or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using such person's name, portrait, picture, likeness or voice, to prevent and restrain the use thereof", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent documentation", "topic": "New York: written consent required for commercial use of a likeness", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "failed", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap", "deferred_state_uncorroborated:us-ny" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ca_consent_definition", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] California: consent must be a signed plain-language agreement", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] California Civil Code s.1708.86 defines consent for the deepfake-pornography cause of action as an agreement written in plain language, signed knowingly and voluntarily by the depicted individual, that includes a general description of the sexually explicit material and the audiovisual work in which it will be incorporated. The statute also provides guidelines for when consent can be rescinded.", "body": "California Civil Code s.1708.86 defines consent for the deepfake-pornography cause of action as an agreement written in plain language, signed knowingly and voluntarily by the depicted individual, that includes a general description of the sexually explicit material and the audiovisual work in which it will be incorporated. The statute also provides guidelines for when consent can be rescinded.\n\nWhat California Senate Judiciary Committee (official bill analysis, AB 621, hearing 15 July 2025) actually says:\n\n““Consent” means an agreement written in plain language signed knowingly and voluntarily by the depicted individual that includes a general description of the sexually explicit material and the audiovisual work in which it will be incorporated.”\n\nNote: This is an official California Senate committee analysis describing Civ. Code s.1708.86(a) as it then stood, analysing the 3 July 2025 version of AB 621. It is NOT the codified statutory text. leginfo.legislature.ca.gov timed out on every attempt this session, so I could not verify the codified wording or any later amendment. The analysis also records that s.1708.86(a)(3)(B) 'Provides clear guidelines for when consent can be rescinded' without setting them out - that detail is unverified. Confidence is medium for that reason, not because the source is doubted.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://sjud.senate.ca.gov/system/files/2025-07/ab-621-bauer-kahan-sjud-analysis.pdf", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "California Senate Judiciary Committee (official bill analysis, AB 621, hearing 15 July 2025)", "evidence_quote": "“Consent” means an agreement written in plain language signed knowingly and voluntarily by the depicted individual that includes a general description of the sexually explicit material and the audiovisual work in which it will be incorporated.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent documentation", "topic": "California: consent must be a signed plain-language agreement", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_ncii_sharing", "category": "Safety", "title": "NCII: England and Wales: sharing an intimate image without consent", "summary": "It is an offence in England and Wales intentionally to share a photograph or film which shows, OR APPEARS TO SHOW, another person in an intimate state, where that person does not consent and the sharer does not reasonably believe they consent. Aggravated forms (intent to cause alarm/distress/humiliation, or for sexual gratification) carry up to 2 years on indictment.", "body": "It is an offence in England and Wales intentionally to share a photograph or film which shows, OR APPEARS TO SHOW, another person in an intimate state, where that person does not consent and the sharer does not reasonably believe they consent. Aggravated forms (intent to cause alarm/distress/humiliation, or for sexual gratification) carry up to 2 years on indictment.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Statute Law Database, King's Printer of Acts of Parliament) actually says:\n\n“A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A intentionally shares a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, another person (B) in an intimate state, (b)B does not consent to the sharing of the photograph or film, and (c)A does not reasonably believe that B consents.”\n\nNote: Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.66B(1), inserted by Online Safety Act 2023 s.188, in force 31 January 2024 (S.I. 2024/31 reg. 2). The words 'or appears to show' are what make this section reach synthetic and altered material at the SHARING stage. Page states the text is up to date with changes in force on or before 27 August 2026; further amendments by Crime and Policing Act 2026 Sch. 13 (inserting s.66B(5A), omitting s.66B(6) and (11)) are listed as not yet applied.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/66B", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Statute Law Database, King's Printer of Acts of Parliament)", "evidence_quote": "A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A intentionally shares a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, another person (B) in an intimate state, (b)B does not consent to the sharing of the photograph or film, and (c)A does not reasonably believe that B consents.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "NCII", "topic": "England and Wales: sharing an intimate image without consent", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_consent_meaning_sharing", "category": "Safety", "title": "England and Wales: general consent can cover a particular act of sharing", "summary": "For the s.66B sharing offences, consent to sharing includes GENERAL consent covering the particular act of sharing as well as specific consent to that act; and whether a belief in consent is reasonable is judged on all the circumstances, INCLUDING any steps the sharer took to ascertain whether the other person consents.", "body": "For the s.66B sharing offences, consent to sharing includes GENERAL consent covering the particular act of sharing as well as specific consent to that act; and whether a belief in consent is reasonable is judged on all the circumstances, INCLUDING any steps the sharer took to ascertain whether the other person consents.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Statute Law Database, King's Printer of Acts of Parliament) actually says:\n\n“(a)“consent” to the sharing of a photograph or film includes general consent covering the particular act of sharing as well as specific consent to the particular act of sharing, and (b)whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.”\n\nNote: SOA 2003 s.66B(6). Two things follow from the text: (i) unlike New York, English law does not require a signed itemised release - a general consent can suffice; (ii) the STEPS TAKEN to ascertain consent are expressly relevant to the reasonable-belief defence, which is the statutory hook for a consent-capture workflow. Note s.66B(6) is listed as omitted by Crime and Policing Act 2026 Sch. 13 para. 4(3), a change not yet applied at the date checked - so this wording is volatile.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/66B", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Statute Law Database, King's Printer of Acts of Parliament)", "evidence_quote": "(a)“consent” to the sharing of a photograph or film includes general consent covering the particular act of sharing as well as specific consent to the particular act of sharing, and (b)whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent", "topic": "England and Wales: general consent can cover a particular act of sharing", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_synthetic_creating", "category": "Safety", "title": "Synthetic imagery: England and Wales: CREATING a purported intimate image without consent is an offence", "summary": "Since 6 February 2026 it is an offence in England and Wales intentionally to create a purported intimate image of another adult without that person's consent and without reasonable belief in consent. A 'purported intimate image' is an image which appears to be, or to include, a photograph or film of the person (but is not, or is not only, one), appears to be of an adult, and appears to show the person in an intimate state. There is a reasonable-excuse defence.", "body": "Since 6 February 2026 it is an offence in England and Wales intentionally to create a purported intimate image of another adult without that person's consent and without reasonable belief in consent. A 'purported intimate image' is an image which appears to be, or to include, a photograph or film of the person (but is not, or is not only, one), appears to be of an adult, and appears to show the person in an intimate state. There is a reasonable-excuse defence.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Statute Law Database, King's Printer of Acts of Parliament) actually says:\n\n“A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A intentionally creates a purported intimate image of another person (B), (b)B does not consent to the creation of the purported intimate image, and (c)A does not reasonably believe that B consents.”\n\nNote: SOA 2003 s.66E(1), inserted (6.2.2026) by Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 (c. 18) s.138(2), s.142(1); S.I. 2026/31 reg. 2. s.66E(2) defines 'purported intimate image': 'an image which— (a)appears to be, or to include, a photograph or film of the person (but is not, or is not only, a photograph or film of the person), (b)appears to be of an adult, and (c)appears to show the person in an intimate state.' Penalty is summary only, s.66E(6). Defence of reasonable excuse, s.66E(5); the Secretary of State must review the operation of that defence and report to Parliament within two years of commencement, s.66E(7). THIS IS THE MOST DIRECTLY ON-POINT PROVISION IN THIS BATCH for IMAGO: it criminalises the ACT OF CREATION, not just sharing, and it is keyed to whether the image APPEARS to be of a real person. 'Intimate state' is defined by s.66D(5)-(9), which I could not open - see could_not_verify.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/66E", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Statute Law Database, King's Printer of Acts of Parliament)", "evidence_quote": "A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A intentionally creates a purported intimate image of another person (B), (b)B does not consent to the creation of the purported intimate image, and (c)A does not reasonably believe that B consents.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "synthetic imagery", "topic": "England and Wales: CREATING a purported intimate image without consent is an offence", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_synthetic_creating_carveout", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Synthetic imagery: England and Wales: the modification carve-out in s.66E(4)", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The creating offence does not catch modifying a photograph or film OF THAT PERSON where the modified image appears to show them but does not appear to show intimate content that was not in the original, or a person who was not in the original. The carve-out is framed around modifying the depicted person's own image.", "body": "The creating offence does not catch modifying a photograph or film OF THAT PERSON where the modified image appears to show them but does not appear to show intimate content that was not in the original, or a person who was not in the original. The carve-out is framed around modifying the depicted person's own image.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Statute Law Database, King's Printer of Acts of Parliament) actually says:\n\n“References in this section to creating a purported intimate image of a person do not include doing so by modifying a photograph or film of the person where what is created by the modification is an image which— (a)appears to show the person, but (b)does not appear to show— (i)something within section 66D(5)(a) to (e) (read with subsections (6) and (7) of that section) which is not shown in the photograph or film, or (ii)a person who is not shown in the photograph or film.”\n\nNote: SOA 2003 s.66E(4). Reading the words as they stand: the carve-out is about modifying a photograph OF PERSON B. Where a synthetic face resembling person C is placed onto a source image of someone else, the source is not a photograph of C, so the carve-out does not appear to be engaged on its face. I have NOT found any case law or official guidance construing s.66E(4), and the Secretary of State's review under s.66E(7) has not yet reported. Recorded as medium confidence and flagged as an interpretive question, not a settled answer.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/66E", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Statute Law Database, King's Printer of Acts of Parliament)", "evidence_quote": "References in this section to creating a purported intimate image of a person do not include doing so by modifying a photograph or film of the person where what is created by the modification is an image which— (a)appears to show the person, but (b)does not appear to show— (i)something within section 66D(5)(a) to (e) (read with subsections (6) and (7) of that section) which is not shown in the photograph or film, or (ii)a person who is not shown in the photograph or film.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "synthetic imagery", "topic": "England and Wales: the modification carve-out in s.66E(4)", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "failed", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "quote_is_nonanswer", "strong_label_on_weak_content" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_toolmaker_offence", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Tool maker liability: England and Wales: making or supplying a purported intimate image generator is a criminal offence", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Since 29 June 2026 it is an either-way offence in England and Wales to make, adapt, supply or offer to supply a thing for use as a generator of purported intimate images. A generator is 'a thing for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person'. 'Thing' expressly includes a program, information in electronic form, and a service. Maximum penalty on indictment is 3 years and/or an unlimited fine.", "body": "Since 29 June 2026 it is an either-way offence in England and Wales to make, adapt, supply or offer to supply a thing for use as a generator of purported intimate images. A generator is 'a thing for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person'. 'Thing' expressly includes a program, information in electronic form, and a service. Maximum penalty on indictment is 3 years and/or an unlimited fine.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted) actually says:\n\n“(1)A person commits an offence if the person— (a)makes or adapts a thing, or (b)supplies or offers to supply a thing, for use as a generator of purported intimate images. (2)A “generator of purported intimate images” is a thing for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person.”\n\nNote: New SOA 2003 s.66I, inserted by Crime and Policing Act 2026 s.99(2). Royal Assent 29 April 2026; s.99 in force 29 June 2026 per Home Office Circular 004/2026. s.66I(7): '“thing” includes a program, information in electronic form and a service' - this expressly reaches downloadable desktop software. s.66I(3) applies an objective test: 'A person makes, adapts, supplies, or offers to supply a thing for use as a generator of purported intimate images if a reasonable person (having regard to all the circumstances) would consider that they do so.' Penalty s.66I(5)(b): 'on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or a fine (or both).' THIS IS THE CLEAREST TOOL-MAKER AUTHORITY FOUND IN ANY JURISDICTION IN THIS BATCH.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/99/enacted/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted)", "evidence_quote": "(1)A person commits an offence if the person— (a)makes or adapts a thing, or (b)supplies or offers to supply a thing, for use as a generator of purported intimate images. (2)A “generator of purported intimate images” is a thing for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "England and Wales: making or supplying a purported intimate image generator is a criminal offence", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_toolmaker_reasonable_steps_defence", "category": "Safety", "title": "England and Wales: the 'all reasonable steps' defence for tool makers", "summary": "It is a defence to the s.66I tool-making offence for the defendant to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the thing being used for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person WITHOUT THAT PERSON'S CONSENT. The burden is on the defendant.", "body": "It is a defence to the s.66I tool-making offence for the defendant to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the thing being used for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person WITHOUT THAT PERSON'S CONSENT. The burden is on the defendant.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted) actually says:\n\n“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the thing being used for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person without the person’s consent.”\n\nNote: SOA 2003 s.66I(4). Note precisely what the defence is keyed to: preventing use WITHOUT CONSENT, not preventing intimate output altogether. That is why consent capture, refusal-to-process and audit logging are the statutorily indicated measures rather than merely prudent ones - see the design_recommendations section. No case law construes 'all reasonable steps' in this context yet; what will satisfy it is untested.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/99/enacted/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted)", "evidence_quote": "It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the thing being used for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person without the person’s consent.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "England and Wales: the 'all reasonable steps' defence for tool makers", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_toolmaker_extraterritorial", "category": "Safety", "title": "England and Wales: the tool offence has extraterritorial reach", "summary": "Section 72(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 applies to the s.66I offence, and the class of persons caught is extended beyond UK nationals to bodies incorporated under the law of any part of the UK and unincorporated associations formed under UK law. Acts done outside England and Wales can therefore be prosecuted.", "body": "Section 72(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 applies to the s.66I offence, and the class of persons caught is extended beyond UK nationals to bodies incorporated under the law of any part of the UK and unincorporated associations formed under UK law. Acts done outside England and Wales can therefore be prosecuted.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted) actually says:\n\n“Section 72(1) applies in relation to an act which, if done in England and Wales, would constitute an offence under this section as if references to a United Kingdom national included— (a)a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or (b)an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.”\n\nNote: SOA 2003 s.66I(6), plus Crime and Policing Act 2026 s.99(4) adding s.66I to Schedule 2 paragraph 1 of the 2003 Act (sexual offences for the purposes of s.72). I did not open s.72 itself, so the precise conditions of extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g. dual criminality, nationality/residence requirements) are not verified here.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/99/enacted/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted)", "evidence_quote": "Section 72(1) applies in relation to an act which, if done in England and Wales, would constitute an offence under this section as if references to a United Kingdom national included— (a)a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or (b)an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "England and Wales: the tool offence has extraterritorial reach", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_toolmaker_officer_liability", "category": "Safety", "title": "England and Wales: directors and managers personally liable for the tool offence", "summary": "Where the s.66I offence is committed by a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association with the consent or connivance of a director, manager, secretary, similar officer, managing member or partner, that individual also commits the offence and is liable to be prosecuted and punished.", "body": "Where the s.66I offence is committed by a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association with the consent or connivance of a director, manager, secretary, similar officer, managing member or partner, that individual also commits the offence and is liable to be prosecuted and punished.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted) actually says:\n\n“If the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of— (a)a relevant person in relation to the body, or (b)a person purporting to act in the capacity of a relevant person in relation to the body, the person (as well as the body) commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”\n\nNote: New SOA 2003 s.66L(2), inserted by Crime and Policing Act 2026 s.99(2). Incorporating does not put an individual behind a corporate shield for this offence. Separately, s.99(5) adds s.66I to Schedule 3 of the 2003 Act, so a defendant sentenced to 12 months or more becomes subject to the sex offender notification requirements in Part 2 of that Act.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/99/enacted/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted)", "evidence_quote": "If the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of— (a)a relevant person in relation to the body, or (b)a person purporting to act in the capacity of a relevant person in relation to the body, the person (as well as the body) commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "England and Wales: directors and managers personally liable for the tool offence", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_ew_isp_safeharbour", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Platform duty: England and Wales: conduit, caching and hosting safe harbours for the tool offence", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] An internet service provider does not commit the s.66I offence merely by providing network access or transmitting user-provided information it does not initiate, select the recipient of, or modify; nor by automatic intermediate caching on stated conditions; nor by hosting user information where it did not know the information was or contained a generator and, on knowing, promptly removed it or disabled access.", "body": "An internet service provider does not commit the s.66I offence merely by providing network access or transmitting user-provided information it does not initiate, select the recipient of, or modify; nor by automatic intermediate caching on stated conditions; nor by hosting user information where it did not know the information was or contained a generator and, on knowing, promptly removed it or disabled access.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted) actually says:\n\n“An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if— (a)when the information was provided the provider did not know that it was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, and (b)on knowing that the information was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.”\n\nNote: New SOA 2003 s.66K(5). Note the shape of the protection: it is an actual-knowledge-plus-prompt-removal safe harbour for INTERMEDIARIES. It does not protect the person who wrote or supplies the generator. A distribution channel (app store, download host, model repository) that is told a hosted item is a generator and does not act promptly falls outside it.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2026/20/section/99/enacted/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (Crime and Policing Act 2026 c. 20, s.99, as enacted)", "evidence_quote": "An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if— (a)when the information was provided the provider did not know that it was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, and (b)on knowing that the information was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "platform duty", "topic": "England and Wales: conduit, caching and hosting safe harbours for the tool offence", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_guid_uk_homeoffice_circular_004_2026", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Home Office circular: commencement and official description of the tool offence", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The Home Office states that s.99 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 came into force on 29 June 2026, that it creates offences of making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply something for use as a generator of purported intimate images (a 'nudification' tool or app), and that the measure targets the making and supply of tools which facilitate intimate image offences.", "body": "The Home Office states that s.99 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 came into force on 29 June 2026, that it creates offences of making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply something for use as a generator of purported intimate images (a 'nudification' tool or app), and that the measure targets the making and supply of tools which facilitate intimate image offences.\n\nWhat UK Home Office (Circular 004/2026) actually says:\n\n“Section 99 inserts new sections 66I, 66J, 66K, and 66L into the Sexual Offences Act 2003 Act, creating offences of making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply something for use as a generator of purported intimate images (that is, a “nudification” tool or app). This measure supplements other intimate image offences by targeting the making and supply of tools which facilitate intimate image offences.”\n\nNote: The circular itself states at paragraph 1 that it 'does not constitute legal advice' and 'is not a statement of law'. Commencement is by the Crime and Policing Act 2026 (Commencement No. 1 and Saving Provision) Regulations 2026 (S.I. 2026/689). The circular also confirms the s.66I(4) reasonable-steps defence and the 3-year maximum, and confirms the s.72 extraterritorial extension.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-0042026-crime-and-policing-act-2026/circular-0042026-crime-and-policing-act-2026-accessible", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "UK Home Office (Circular 004/2026)", "evidence_quote": "Section 99 inserts new sections 66I, 66J, 66K, and 66L into the Sexual Offences Act 2003 Act, creating offences of making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply something for use as a generator of purported intimate images (that is, a “nudification” tool or app). This measure supplements other intimate image offences by targeting the making and supply of tools which facilitate intimate image offences.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "Home Office circular: commencement and official description of the tool offence", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_uk_gdpr_consent_withdrawal", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Revocation: Data-protection consent is withdrawable at any time and must be as easy to withdraw as to give", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Where processing of personal data is based on consent, the controller must be able to demonstrate that the data subject consented; the request must be clearly distinguishable, intelligible and in clear and plain language; and the data subject has the right to withdraw consent at any time, must be told so beforehand, and withdrawal must be as easy as giving it. Withdrawal does not retrospectively unmake lawful processing.", "body": "Where processing of personal data is based on consent, the controller must be able to demonstrate that the data subject consented; the request must be clearly distinguishable, intelligible and in clear and plain language; and the data subject has the right to withdraw consent at any time, must be told so beforehand, and withdrawal must be as easy as giving it. Withdrawal does not retrospectively unmake lawful processing.\n\nWhat legislation.gov.uk (UK General Data Protection Regulation, Article 7) actually says:\n\n“The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.”\n\nNote: UK GDPR Article 7(3), as published by legislation.gov.uk; page states it is up to date with changes in force on or before 27 August 2026. This is the UK-assimilated version of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. The EU text of Article 7(3) is to my knowledge identical, but EUR-Lex returned empty bodies for every request this session so I did NOT verify the EU wording - do not cite this record as the EU text. Note also the distinction that matters: this is a right to withdraw consent to PROCESSING PERSONAL DATA. It is not, by itself, a right to compel deletion of a published work; that runs through Article 17 and other provisions I did not open. Article 7(1) is the demonstrability duty that makes record-keeping legally load-bearing: 'the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented'.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679/article/7", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "legislation.gov.uk (UK General Data Protection Regulation, Article 7)", "evidence_quote": "The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "revocation", "topic": "Data-protection consent is withdrawable at any time and must be as easy to withdraw as to give", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_il_biometric_written_release", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Consent documentation: Illinois: a written release is required before capturing face geometry", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, no private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade or otherwise obtain a person's biometric identifier - which includes a scan of face geometry - unless it first informs the subject in writing that it is being collected or stored, informs them in writing of the specific purpose and length of term of collection, storage and use, and receives a written release executed by the subject.", "body": "Under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, no private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade or otherwise obtain a person's biometric identifier - which includes a scan of face geometry - unless it first informs the subject in writing that it is being collected or stored, informs them in writing of the specific purpose and length of term of collection, storage and use, and receives a written release executed by the subject.\n\nWhat Supreme Court of Illinois, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186 (official reports) actually says:\n\n“(b) No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric information, unless it first: (1) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject's legally authorized representative.”\n\nNote: 740 ILCS 14/15(b), quoted verbatim by the Illinois Supreme Court at paragraph 20. The court records at paragraph 19 that '“biometric identifier”' means 'a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry'. Relevance to IMAGO: if the tool computes a face-geometry representation of a second person, that is on its face a biometric identifier, and BIPA's written-release duty attaches BEFORE collection - which is earlier in time than any NCII statute bites. I could not open ilga.gov to read the current consolidated text of s.15, so post-2019 amendments (including the 2024 amendment on per-scan accrual) are not verified here.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Resources/f71510f1-fb2a-43d8-ba14-292c8009dfd9/123186.pdf", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Supreme Court of Illinois, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186 (official reports)", "evidence_quote": "(b) No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric information, unless it first: (1) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject's legally authorized representative.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent documentation", "topic": "Illinois: a written release is required before capturing face geometry", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "failed", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap", "deferred_state_uncorroborated:us-il" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_il_biometric_no_injury_needed", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Consent documentation: Illinois: the paperwork failure IS the injury", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The Illinois Supreme Court held that a person need not allege any actual injury or adverse effect beyond violation of their rights under BIPA in order to be 'aggrieved' and sue for liquidated damages and injunctive relief. The statutory violation is itself sufficient.", "body": "The Illinois Supreme Court held that a person need not allege any actual injury or adverse effect beyond violation of their rights under BIPA in order to be 'aggrieved' and sue for liquidated damages and injunctive relief. The statutory violation is itself sufficient.\n\nWhat Supreme Court of Illinois, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186 (official reports) actually says:\n\n“when a private entity fails to comply with one of section 15's requirements, that violation constitutes an invasion, impairment, or denial of the statutory rights of any person or customer whose biometric identifier or biometric information is subject to the breach. Consistent with the authority cited above, such a person or customer would clearly be “aggrieved” within the meaning of section 20 of the Act (id. § 20) and entitled to seek recovery under that provision. No additional consequences need be pleaded or proved.”\n\nNote: Rosenbach paragraph 33. The court also quotes s.20 remedies at paragraph 21: liquidated damages of $1,000 for a negligent violation or $5,000 for an intentional or reckless violation, or actual damages, whichever is greater, plus fees and costs. The court further notes at paragraph 20 that section 15 imposes obligations 'regarding the collection, retention, disclosure, and destruction' of biometric identifiers - the specific retention-schedule duty in s.15(a) is not quoted in the opinion and I could not verify its current text; see could_not_verify.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Resources/f71510f1-fb2a-43d8-ba14-292c8009dfd9/123186.pdf", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Supreme Court of Illinois, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186 (official reports)", "evidence_quote": "when a private entity fails to comply with one of section 15's requirements, that violation constitutes an invasion, impairment, or denial of the statutory rights of any person or customer whose biometric identifier or biometric information is subject to the breach. Consistent with the authority cited above, such a person or customer would clearly be “aggrieved” within the meaning of section 20 of the Act (id. § 20) and entitled to seek recovery under that provision. No additional consequences need be pleaded or proved.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent documentation", "topic": "Illinois: the paperwork failure IS the injury", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "failed", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap", "deferred_state_uncorroborated:us-il" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_mn_deepfake_criminal", "category": "Safety", "title": "NCII: Minnesota: criminal offence of disseminating a sexual deep fake", "summary": "It is a crime in Minnesota intentionally to disseminate a deep fake where the actor knows or should know the depicted individual did not consent, the deep fake realistically depicts another individual's intimate parts or ARTIFICIALLY GENERATED intimate parts presented as those of the depicted individual, or the depicted individual engaging in a sexual act, and the depicted individual is identifiable. Gross misdemeanour, rising to 3 years and/or $5,000 where aggravating factors apply.", "body": "It is a crime in Minnesota intentionally to disseminate a deep fake where the actor knows or should know the depicted individual did not consent, the deep fake realistically depicts another individual's intimate parts or ARTIFICIALLY GENERATED intimate parts presented as those of the depicted individual, or the depicted individual engaging in a sexual act, and the depicted individual is identifiable. Gross misdemeanour, rising to 3 years and/or $5,000 where aggravating factors apply.\n\nWhat Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (2025 Minnesota Statutes) actually says:\n\n“It is a crime to intentionally disseminate a deep fake when: (1) the actor knows or reasonably should know that the depicted individual did not consent to the dissemination; (2) the deep fake realistically depicts any of the following: (i) the intimate parts of another individual presented as the intimate parts of the depicted individual; (ii) artificially generated intimate parts presented as the intimate parts of the depicted individual; or (iii) the depicted individual engaging in a sexual act; and (3) the depicted individual is identifiable”\n\nNote: Minn. Stat. s.617.262 subd. 2, added by 2023 c. 58 s. 3. Aggravating factors at subd. 3(b) include maintaining a website, online service, online application or mobile application for the purpose of disseminating the deep fake. Subd. 7 preserves immunity for interactive computer services as defined in 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2), telecoms and broadband providers, 'solely as a result of content or information provided by another person'.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/617.262", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (2025 Minnesota Statutes)", "evidence_quote": "It is a crime to intentionally disseminate a deep fake when: (1) the actor knows or reasonably should know that the depicted individual did not consent to the dissemination; (2) the deep fake realistically depicts any of the following: (i) the intimate parts of another individual presented as the intimate parts of the depicted individual; (ii) artificially generated intimate parts presented as the intimate parts of the depicted individual; or (iii) the depicted individual engaging in a sexual act; and (3) the depicted individual is identifiable", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "NCII", "topic": "Minnesota: criminal offence of disseminating a sexual deep fake", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_mn_consent_creation_not_dissemination", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Minnesota: consent to creation or private transmission is expressly no defence to dissemination", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Minnesota states as an express statutory rule that it is not a defence that the depicted individual consented to the creation or possession of the deep fake, or to its private transmission to someone other than those to whom it was disseminated.", "body": "Minnesota states as an express statutory rule that it is not a defence that the depicted individual consented to the creation or possession of the deep fake, or to its private transmission to someone other than those to whom it was disseminated.\n\nWhat Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (2025 Minnesota Statutes) actually says:\n\n“It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the depicted individual consented to the creation or possession of the deep fake, or the private transmission of the deep fake to an individual other than those to whom the deep fake was disseminated.”\n\nNote: Minn. Stat. s.617.262 subd. 4. Together with 47 U.S.C. 223(h)(5) and 15 U.S.C. 6851(b)(2) this is the third independent statutory statement of the same principle: the consent layers are separate and consent to one does not carry to the next.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/617.262", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (2025 Minnesota Statutes)", "evidence_quote": "It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the depicted individual consented to the creation or possession of the deep fake, or the private transmission of the deep fake to an individual other than those to whom the deep fake was disseminated.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "consent", "topic": "Minnesota: consent to creation or private transmission is expressly no defence to dissemination", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_mn_toolmaker_nudification", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Tool maker liability: Minnesota: prohibition on owning or controlling software that lets users nudify images", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] From 1 August 2026, a person who owns or controls a website, application, SOFTWARE, program or other service must not allow a user to access, download or use it to nudify an image or video, or nudify on a user's behalf, and must not advertise or promote such a service. Civil penalty up to $500,000 per unlawful access, download or use, enforceable by the Attorney General, plus a private action for up to treble compensatory damages, punitive damages and injunctive relief.", "body": "From 1 August 2026, a person who owns or controls a website, application, SOFTWARE, program or other service must not allow a user to access, download or use it to nudify an image or video, or nudify on a user's behalf, and must not advertise or promote such a service. Civil penalty up to $500,000 per unlawful access, download or use, enforceable by the Attorney General, plus a private action for up to treble compensatory damages, punitive damages and injunctive relief.\n\nWhat Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (H.F. No. 1606, Second Engrossment; bill history shows Governor Approval 05/07/2026) actually says:\n\n“(a) A person who owns or controls a website, application, software, program, or other service must not: (1) allow a user to access, download, or use the website, application, software, program, or other service to nudify an image or video; or (2) nudify an image or video on behalf of a user. (b) No person may advertise or promote any website, application, software, program, or other service that performs the actions described in paragraph (a).”\n\nNote: New Minn. Stat. s.325E.91 subd. 2, effective 1 August 2026 and applying to causes of action accruing on or after that date. TWO POINTS OF REAL IMPORTANCE. First, subd. 1(d) defines 'nudify' narrowly: 'an image or video is altered or generated to depict an intimate part NOT DEPICTED IN AN ORIGINAL UNALTERED IMAGE OR VIDEO of an identifiable individual' and so realistic that a reasonable person would believe the intimate part belongs to that individual. A face replacement on an already-nude body does not obviously add an intimate part that was not there. Second, subd. 3 exempts services that 'require the technical skill of a user to nudify an image or video', with 'technical skill' defined as 'substantial application of individualized technological or artistic skill and judgment by a human creator in directing, shaping, or controlling the output'. Both of these are untested and potentially decisive for a professional-grade tool. Confidence is medium because I read the Second Engrossment PDF rather than the chaptered session law, and because s.325E.91 was not yet in the 2025 statutes edition on revisor.mn.gov.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2025/0/HF/1606/versions/2/pdf/", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (H.F. No. 1606, Second Engrossment; bill history shows Governor Approval 05/07/2026)", "evidence_quote": "(a) A person who owns or controls a website, application, software, program, or other service must not: (1) allow a user to access, download, or use the website, application, software, program, or other service to nudify an image or video; or (2) nudify an image or video on behalf of a user. (b) No person may advertise or promote any website, application, software, program, or other service that performs the actions described in paragraph (a).", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "Minnesota: prohibition on owning or controlling software that lets users nudify images", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_mn_toolmaker_penalty_and_230", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Tool maker liability: Minnesota: $500,000 per violation, and section 230 expressly preserved", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The Minnesota nudification prohibition carries a civil penalty of up to $500,000 for each unlawful access, download or use, enforceable by the Attorney General, and it expressly does not alter or amend the liabilities and protections granted by 47 U.S.C. 230.", "body": "The Minnesota nudification prohibition carries a civil penalty of up to $500,000 for each unlawful access, download or use, enforceable by the Attorney General, and it expressly does not alter or amend the liabilities and protections granted by 47 U.S.C. 230.\n\nWhat Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (H.F. No. 1606, Second Engrossment) actually says:\n\n“The attorney general may enforce this section under section 8.31. In addition to other remedies or penalties, a person who violates this section is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $500,000 for each unlawful access, download, or use under subdivision 2.”\n\nNote: New Minn. Stat. s.325E.91 subd. 5(a); subd. 7: 'This section does not alter or amend the liabilities and protections granted by United States Code, title 47, section 230, and shall be construed in a manner consistent with federal law.' Jurisdiction under subd. 6 where either plaintiff or defendant resides in Minnesota. Same medium-confidence caveat as the preceding record.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2025/0/HF/1606/versions/2/pdf/", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes (H.F. No. 1606, Second Engrossment)", "evidence_quote": "The attorney general may enforce this section under section 8.31. In addition to other remedies or penalties, a person who violates this section is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $500,000 for each unlawful access, download, or use under subdivision 2.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "Minnesota: $500,000 per violation, and section 230 expressly preserved", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ca_toolmaker_facilitation", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] California: civil liability extended to those who knowingly facilitate or recklessly aid and abet", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] AB 621 (Ch. 673, Stats. 2025) extended the California deepfake-pornography cause of action to a person who 'knowingly facilitates or recklessly aids or abets' the prohibited creation or disclosure, created a presumption against operators of a 'deepfake pornography service' unless they produce evidence of the depicted individual's express written consent, and created a presumption against upstream service providers who fail to cut off a deepfake pornography service within 30 days of being given sufficient evidence.", "body": "AB 621 (Ch. 673, Stats. 2025) extended the California deepfake-pornography cause of action to a person who 'knowingly facilitates or recklessly aids or abets' the prohibited creation or disclosure, created a presumption against operators of a 'deepfake pornography service' unless they produce evidence of the depicted individual's express written consent, and created a presumption against upstream service providers who fail to cut off a deepfake pornography service within 30 days of being given sufficient evidence.\n\nWhat California Senate Judiciary Committee (official bill analysis, AB 621, hearing 15 July 2025) actually says:\n\n“A person that owns, operates, or controls a deepfake pornography service is engaged in the creation and intentional disclosure of digitized sexually explicit material and shall be presumed to have known that the depicted individual did not consent to the creation or disclosure of the digitized sexually explicit material, unless the person produces evidence of the depicted individual’s express written consent.”\n\nNote: Describing amendments to Cal. Civ. Code s.1708.86. 'Deepfake pornography service' is defined in the analysis as 'a website, mobile application, or other service the primary purpose of which is to create digitized sexually explicit material' - a primary-purpose test, which a general-purpose face-replacement tool may or may not meet. The upstream-provider presumption arises where the provider 'fails to take all necessary steps to stop providing services that enable the ongoing operation of a deepfake pornography service within 30 days of receiving this evidence.' Statutory damages up to $50,000, or $250,000 where malicious; public prosecutor penalties of $25,000 per violation, $50,000 if malicious. IMPORTANT CAVEAT: this is a committee analysis of the 3 July 2025 version, not the codified text; leginfo was unreachable. Treat the detail as indicative and verify against the code before relying on it.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://sjud.senate.ca.gov/system/files/2025-07/ab-621-bauer-kahan-sjud-analysis.pdf", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "California Senate Judiciary Committee (official bill analysis, AB 621, hearing 15 July 2025)", "evidence_quote": "A person that owns, operates, or controls a deepfake pornography service is engaged in the creation and intentional disclosure of digitized sexually explicit material and shall be presumed to have known that the depicted individual did not consent to the creation or disclosure of the digitized sexually explicit material, unless the person produces evidence of the depicted individual’s express written consent.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "California: civil liability extended to those who knowingly facilitate or recklessly aid and abet", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ca_toolmaker_disclaimer_no_defence", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Tool maker liability: California: a terms-of-use prohibition is not a defence for a deepfake porn service", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] AB 621 provides that it is not a defence that a deepfake pornography service carries a disclaimer or statement telling users they are prohibited from generating digitized sexually explicit material of a depicted individual without that individual's consent.", "body": "AB 621 provides that it is not a defence that a deepfake pornography service carries a disclaimer or statement telling users they are prohibited from generating digitized sexually explicit material of a depicted individual without that individual's consent.\n\nWhat California Senate Judiciary Committee (official bill analysis, AB 621) actually says:\n\n“Provides that it shall not be a defense to an action hereunder that a deepfake pornography service has a disclaimer or statement that states that users are prohibited from generating digitized sexually explicit material of a depicted individual without the individual’s consent.”\n\nNote: This matters for tool design: a clickwrap 'you promise you have consent' by itself is expressly disclaimed as a defence in California, and expressly disclaimed as a defence to the New York cause of action in a related form (s.52-c(2)(b)). Contrast the UK s.66I(4) defence, which requires ALL REASONABLE STEPS actually taken to prevent non-consensual use - a higher, conduct-based bar than a notice. Same committee-analysis caveat as above.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://sjud.senate.ca.gov/system/files/2025-07/ab-621-bauer-kahan-sjud-analysis.pdf", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "California Senate Judiciary Committee (official bill analysis, AB 621)", "evidence_quote": "Provides that it shall not be a defense to an action hereunder that a deepfake pornography service has a disclaimer or statement that states that users are prohibited from generating digitized sexually explicit material of a depicted individual without the individual’s consent.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "California: a terms-of-use prohibition is not a defence for a deepfake porn service", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_platform_section230", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Platform liability: Section 230: what it protects and the holes in it", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] No provider or user of an interactive computer service is to be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by ANOTHER information content provider. But an 'information content provider' is anyone responsible, in whole OR IN PART, for the creation or development of the information; and s.230 expressly does not impair enforcement of s.223, chapter 71 (obscenity) or chapter 110 (sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other federal criminal statute.", "body": "No provider or user of an interactive computer service is to be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by ANOTHER information content provider. But an 'information content provider' is anyone responsible, in whole OR IN PART, for the creation or development of the information; and s.230 expressly does not impair enforcement of s.223, chapter 71 (obscenity) or chapter 110 (sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other federal criminal statute.\n\nWhat U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2024 Edition) actually says:\n\n“The term \"information content provider\" means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”\n\nNote: 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(3); immunity at 230(c)(1); criminal-law carve-out at 230(e)(1): 'Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.' Two consequences for a tool maker. First, because the TAKE IT DOWN Act offence sits IN s.223, s.230 provides no shield against it. Second, the 'in whole or in part ... creation or development' definition is the doctrinal hook by which a system that generates content may be characterised as a content provider rather than a protected intermediary. I found NO case in this session applying 230(f)(3) to a generative face-swap tool; that question is open.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title47/html/USCODE-2024-title47-chap5-subchapII-partI-sec230.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2024 Edition)", "evidence_quote": "The term \"information content provider\" means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "platform liability", "topic": "Section 230: what it protects and the holes in it", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_federal_toolmaker_aiding_abetting", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Tool maker liability: US federal: the only general facilitation hook is the accomplice statute", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Federal law punishes as a principal anyone who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of a federal offence, and anyone who wilfully causes an act to be done which would be an offence if directly performed. There is no provision in the TAKE IT DOWN Act, in 15 U.S.C. 6851, or in 47 U.S.C. 230 that is directed at the maker or supplier of a general-purpose image-manipulation tool.", "body": "Federal law punishes as a principal anyone who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of a federal offence, and anyone who wilfully causes an act to be done which would be an offence if directly performed. There is no provision in the TAKE IT DOWN Act, in 15 U.S.C. 6851, or in 47 U.S.C. 230 that is directed at the maker or supplier of a general-purpose image-manipulation tool.\n\nWhat U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2024 Edition) actually says:\n\n“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”\n\nNote: 18 U.S.C. 2(a); 2(b) adds 'Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.' TO BE EXPLICIT ABOUT THE HONEST ANSWER: I read the full text of the TAKE IT DOWN Act, 15 U.S.C. 6851, 47 U.S.C. 230, 18 U.S.C. 2256 and 18 U.S.C. 1466A in this session. NONE of them contains a provision addressed to the maker or supplier of a face-swap tool as such. The operative verb throughout the federal NCII provisions is 'publish' or 'disclose'. Section 2 requires the accomplice's own culpable mental state as to the underlying offence, and I found no authority applying it to the author of general-purpose software. At federal level in the United States, tool-maker liability for adult NCII is NOT ESTABLISHED. Where the tool touches minors, 18 U.S.C. 2256(8) and 1466A operate on the images themselves and s.2 has real bite - but that is a different question.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partI-chap1-sec2.htm", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "U.S. Government Publishing Office (United States Code, 2024 Edition)", "evidence_quote": "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "tool maker liability", "topic": "US federal: the only general facilitation hook is the accomplice statute", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_eu_directive_2024_1385_article5", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] NCII: EU: the Violence Against Women Directive criminalises non-consensual sharing of intimate or manipulated material", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2024/1385 requires Member States to criminalise three things: non-consensual public distribution by ICT of material depicting sexually explicit activities or intimate parts where it is likely to cause serious harm; producing, manipulating or altering material to make it appear a person is engaged in sexually explicit activities and making it publicly accessible without consent; and threatening to do either in order to coerce. It is limited to DISTRIBUTION and threats; non-consensual creation as such is not covered.", "body": "Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2024/1385 requires Member States to criminalise three things: non-consensual public distribution by ICT of material depicting sexually explicit activities or intimate parts where it is likely to cause serious harm; producing, manipulating or altering material to make it appear a person is engaged in sexually explicit activities and making it publicly accessible without consent; and threatening to do either in order to coerce. It is limited to DISTRIBUTION and threats; non-consensual creation as such is not covered.\n\nWhat German Law Journal (Cambridge University Press), Vol. 25 Issue 9, pp. 1472-1493 actually says:\n\n“Another significant limitation is that the provisions in Article 5(1) are restricted to the distribution of materials or the threat to distribute them. This means that the non-consensual creating or taking of intimate imagery is not included.”\n\nNote: RECORDED AS TIER B AND MUST NOT BE DRESSED AS THE DIRECTIVE TEXT. EUR-Lex (both /eli/ and /legal-content/ HTML and PDF forms) and europarl.europa.eu returned empty response bodies on every attempt this session, so I could not obtain the verbatim Article 5. This is peer-reviewed academic analysis in a well-regarded journal. The article makes a further point of direct relevance: 'Under letter (b), the scope of Article 5(1) relating to altered and deepfake imagery is even more limited. It includes only imagery making it appear as though a person is “engaged in sexually explicit activities.” ... This definition, therefore, excludes material produced through “nudification” apps and subsequently distributed without consent, as it may not depict someone actively engaging in sexual activities.' The transposition deadline of 14 June 2027 appeared only in a search result summary and was NOT verified on a page I opened - see could_not_verify.", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-law-journal/article/imagebased-sexual-abuse-and-eu-law-a-critical-analysis/B0CF334A0037DE3CA2067B79F506EB87", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "German Law Journal (Cambridge University Press), Vol. 25 Issue 9, pp. 1472-1493", "evidence_quote": "Another significant limitation is that the provisions in Article 5(1) are restricted to the distribution of materials or the threat to distribute them. This means that the non-consensual creating or taking of intimate imagery is not included.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "NCII", "topic": "EU: the Violence Against Women Directive criminalises non-consensual sharing of intimate or manipulated material", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_eu_aiact_article50_provider_marking", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Labelling: EU AI Act Article 50: machine-readable marking duty on providers, disclosure duty on deployers", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Article 50(2) of the AI Act requires providers of AI systems generating synthetic image, audio, video or text to ensure outputs are marked in a machine-readable format and detectable as artificially generated or manipulated, using effective, interoperable, robust and reliable technical solutions so far as technically feasible. Article 50(4) requires deployers of a system that generates or manipulates image, audio or video constituting a deep fake to disclose that the content has been artificially generated or manipulated.", "body": "Article 50(2) of the AI Act requires providers of AI systems generating synthetic image, audio, video or text to ensure outputs are marked in a machine-readable format and detectable as artificially generated or manipulated, using effective, interoperable, robust and reliable technical solutions so far as technically feasible. Article 50(4) requires deployers of a system that generates or manipulates image, audio or video constituting a deep fake to disclose that the content has been artificially generated or manipulated.\n\nWhat Future of Life Institute, EU Artificial Intelligence Act explorer (unofficial reproduction of the Official Journal text of 13 June 2024) actually says:\n\n“Providers of AI systems, including general-purpose AI systems, generating synthetic audio, image, video or text content, shall ensure that the outputs of the AI system are marked in a machine-readable format and detectable as artificially generated or manipulated.”\n\nNote: RECORDED AS TIER B. This is a mirror maintained by the Future of Life Institute, not the Official Journal. EUR-Lex returned empty bodies for CELEX:32024R1689 in every requested format this session. The mirror itself carries the caveat 'This translation is a machine-generated translation. It is not the official translation provided by the European Parliament'. THIS PROVISION IS THE ONE EU DUTY IN THIS BATCH THAT FALLS DIRECTLY ON A TOOL MAKER RATHER THAN A USER. Note the exemption in Article 50(2): the marking obligation 'shall not apply to the extent the AI systems perform an assistive function for standard editing or do not substantially alter the input data provided by the deployer or the semantics thereof' - whether replacing a face is 'standard editing' or a substantial alteration of semantics is not resolved by the text. Article 50(4) carries a narrower obligation for evidently artistic, creative, satirical or fictional work: disclosure 'in an appropriate manner that does not hamper the display or enjoyment of the work'. Verify against the Official Journal before relying on exact wording.", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/50/", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Future of Life Institute, EU Artificial Intelligence Act explorer (unofficial reproduction of the Official Journal text of 13 June 2024)", "evidence_quote": "Providers of AI systems, including general-purpose AI systems, generating synthetic audio, image, video or text content, shall ensure that the outputs of the AI system are marked in a machine-readable format and detectable as artificially generated or manipulated.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "labelling", "topic": "EU AI Act Article 50: machine-readable marking duty on providers, disclosure duty on deployers", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_eu_aiact_article50_dates", "category": "Safety", "title": "Labelling: EU: AI Act transparency obligations apply from 2 August 2026, with a Commission Code of Practice", "summary": "The European Commission states that the AI Act transparency obligations apply from 2 August 2026, that from that date deepfakes and AI-generated or AI-manipulated text published on matters of public interest must be clearly labelled and users must be informed when interacting with an interactive AI system, and that it published a final voluntary Code of Practice on marking and labelling AI-generated content on 10 June 2026.", "body": "The European Commission states that the AI Act transparency obligations apply from 2 August 2026, that from that date deepfakes and AI-generated or AI-manipulated text published on matters of public interest must be clearly labelled and users must be informed when interacting with an interactive AI system, and that it published a final voluntary Code of Practice on marking and labelling AI-generated content on 10 June 2026.\n\nWhat European Commission, DG CONNECT (Shaping Europe's digital future) actually says:\n\n“The Code is voluntary and sets out practical steps to help providers and deployers of generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems meet the AI Act transparency obligations that will apply from 2 August 2026.”\n\nNote: Page last updated 12 June 2026. The Code is expressly VOLUNTARY - signing it is not itself a legal obligation, but it is the Commission's stated compliance pathway for Article 50. The Commission also publishes 'EU Icons for labelling AI-generated content'. A separate set of finalised Commission guidelines on Article 50 implementation was reported as published on 20 July 2026; I did not open that document and have not verified it - see could_not_verify.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-publishes-code-practice-marking-and-labelling-ai-generated-content", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "European Commission, DG CONNECT (Shaping Europe's digital future)", "evidence_quote": "The Code is voluntary and sets out practical steps to help providers and deployers of generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems meet the AI Act transparency obligations that will apply from 2 August 2026.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "labelling", "topic": "EU: AI Act transparency obligations apply from 2 August 2026, with a Commission Code of Practice", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" } }, { "id": "learn_r18_consent_ncii_synthetic_law_us_ca_caita_provenance", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Labelling: California AI Transparency Act: latent and manifest disclosure duties, operative 2 August 2026", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] The California AI Transparency Act (SB 942 as amended by AB 853) became operative on 2 August 2026. Covered providers - generative AI systems with more than one million monthly visitors or users that are publicly accessible in California - must offer a free public AI detection tool, offer users a manifest disclosure option, and embed a latent disclosure in all AI-generated image, video or audio content. Enforcement is by the Attorney General at $5,000 per violation per day; there is no private right of action.", "body": "The California AI Transparency Act (SB 942 as amended by AB 853) became operative on 2 August 2026. Covered providers - generative AI systems with more than one million monthly visitors or users that are publicly accessible in California - must offer a free public AI detection tool, offer users a manifest disclosure option, and embed a latent disclosure in all AI-generated image, video or audio content. Enforcement is by the Attorney General at $5,000 per violation per day; there is no private right of action.\n\nWhat Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (LawFlash) actually says:\n\n“Providers must embed a “latent disclosure” for all AI-generated image, video, or audio content. This disclosure must uniquely identify the content, provide information about the name and version of the GenAI system used, and provide the date the content was created or altered. CAITA requires the disclosure to be durable, consistent with widely accepted industry standards, and compatible with the service provider’s AI detection tool.”\n\nNote: RECORDED AS TIER B - reputable law-firm analysis, not the statute. leginfo.legislature.ca.gov was unreachable all session. Statutory citations given by the firm: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code ss.22757.1-22757.5. Directly relevant thresholds and dates for IMAGO: the one-million-monthly-user threshold means a small desktop tool is likely outside CAITA today; but the firm records that pending SB 1000 'would ... Eliminate the one-million-monthly-visitors-or-users threshold for covered providers, so CAITA would reach any GenAI system that is publicly accessible in the state.' Also: licensing a GenAI system to a third party requires contractually preserving latent disclosure, with a 96-hour licence-revocation duty on discovering a licensee disabled it. From 1 January 2027 hosting platforms may not knowingly offer systems that fail the latent-disclosure requirement - which would affect distribution channels for a face-swap tool. Verify all of this against the code before acting on it.", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/08/new-california-ai-disclosure-rules-become-operative", "last_verified": "2026-08-28", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (LawFlash)", "evidence_quote": "Providers must embed a “latent disclosure” for all AI-generated image, video, or audio content. This disclosure must uniquely identify the content, provide information about the name and version of the GenAI system used, and provide the date the content was created or altered. CAITA requires the disclosure to be durable, consistent with widely accepted industry standards, and compatible with the service provider’s AI detection tool.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "18-consent-ncii-synthetic", "subject": "labelling", "topic": "California AI Transparency Act: latent and manifest disclosure duties, operative 2 August 2026", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } } ] }