{ "batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "articles": [ { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_onlyfans_verification_marks", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] OnlyFans: Verification selfie — whether tattoos or visible marks are required or prohibited", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] OnlyFans public help text for creator account opening states only that applicants must be 18 and agree to the Terms of Service; no requirement about visible or covered tattoos/marks in the verification selfie appears in the publicly accessible help pages.", "body": "OnlyFans public help text for creator account opening states only that applicants must be 18 and agree to the Terms of Service; no requirement about visible or covered tattoos/marks in the verification selfie appears in the publicly accessible help pages.\n\nWhat OnlyFans actually says:\n\n“You must be at least 18 years old and agree to OnlyFans' Terms of Service to create an account and share content on OnlyFans as a Creator. If you want to open a Creator account you will first need to register as a Fan and then complete the additional Creator Onboarding Process.”\n\nNote: The Creator Onboarding Process is behind a login wall and was not accessible. No mention of tattoos, scars, or distinctive marks anywhere in the public help text.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://onlyfans.com/help/196/197/198", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "VERIFIED RULE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "OnlyFans", "evidence_quote": "You must be at least 18 years old and agree to OnlyFans' Terms of Service to create an account and share content on OnlyFans as a Creator. If you want to open a Creator account you will first need to register as a Fan and then complete the additional Creator Onboarding Process.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "OnlyFans", "topic": "Verification selfie — whether tattoos or visible marks are required or prohibited", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "Public help centre text; login-gated onboarding not accessible", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_dermablend_quickfix_body_how_to", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Manufacturer's own application instructions for covering tattoos and scars with body makeup (stick format)", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Dermablend's own product page for Quick-Fix® Body gives a four-step application method: apply with short strokes, tap and blend edges, set with loose setting powder for 2–5 minutes and buff off for up to 16-hour wear, with an optional contouring hack.", "body": "Dermablend's own product page for Quick-Fix® Body gives a four-step application method: apply with short strokes, tap and blend edges, set with loose setting powder for 2–5 minutes and buff off for up to 16-hour wear, with an optional contouring hack.\n\nWhat Dermablend Professional actually says:\n\n“1. Apply: Use short strokes and apply over desired area. 2. Blend: Tap to build coverage to desired level then blend edges into skin. 3. Set: For up to 16 hours of wear, apply setting powder and leave on for 2-5 minutes; buff off. 4. Hack: Can be used in a deeper shade for body contouring.”\n\nNote: Product described on the same page as: 'Whether you're covering a scar, camouflaging a tattoo, or evening out skin tone on your legs or arms, this full coverage body makeup delivers flawless results that last up to 16 hours when set with our Loose Setting Powder.' Format: stick. Properties claimed on page: 'Smudge-, transfer, and water-resistant body makeup; Dermatologist-approved body makeup for all skin types; Ideal body makeup for scars, tattoos, bruises, vitiligo, rosacea, stretch marks, sun spots & more'. Formulated without: 'Parabens; Phthalates; Triclosan; Sodium Lauryl Sulfate (SLS)'.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://dermablend.com/products/quick-fix%E2%84%A2-body", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Dermablend Professional", "evidence_quote": "1. Apply: Use short strokes and apply over desired area. 2. Blend: Tap to build coverage to desired level then blend edges into skin. 3. Set: For up to 16 hours of wear, apply setting powder and leave on for 2-5 minutes; buff off. 4. Hack: Can be used in a deeper shade for body contouring.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Dermablend Quick-Fix® Body", "topic": "Manufacturer's own application instructions for covering tattoos and scars with body makeup (stick format)", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "Consumer product; globally sold", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_dermablend_leg_and_body_description", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Manufacturer's own product description for liquid body foundation covering tattoos and scars", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Dermablend's own product page describes Leg and Body Makeup as a dermatologist-tested body foundation that covers scars, stretch marks, tattoos and veins with water-resistant, transfer-resistant wear for up to 16 hours when set with Loose Setting Powder.", "body": "Dermablend's own product page describes Leg and Body Makeup as a dermatologist-tested body foundation that covers scars, stretch marks, tattoos and veins with water-resistant, transfer-resistant wear for up to 16 hours when set with Loose Setting Powder.\n\nWhat Dermablend Professional actually says:\n\n“Confidence starts with coverage you can count on– plus protection your skin deserves. Our Leg and Body Makeup with SPF 25 is a and a high concentration of high-performance pigments is a dermatologist-tested body foundation designed to cover scars, stretch marks, tattoos, veins, and other skin concerns while helping protect skin from harmful UV rays. This breathable, buildable long-wear body makeup evens skin tone with a natural-looking finish that resists transfer, sweat, and humidity. Infused with hydrating ingredients, this balm moisturizes and strengthens skin barrier repair function Formulated with true-to-tone pigments, it delivers water-resistant wear that stays comfortable for up to 16 hours when set with our Loose Setting Powder.”\n\nNote: Format: liquid/foundation (vs. stick for Quick-Fix Body). Numbered how-to application steps were not present on this product page in the fetched text; see 76.dermablend.quickfix-body.how-to for step-by-step instructions from the same manufacturer.", "source_type": "official", "source_link": "https://dermablend.com/products/leg-and-body-makeup", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "A", "source_publisher": "Dermablend Professional", "evidence_quote": "Confidence starts with coverage you can count on– plus protection your skin deserves. Our Leg and Body Makeup with SPF 25 is a and a high concentration of high-performance pigments is a dermatologist-tested body foundation designed to cover scars, stretch marks, tattoos, veins, and other skin concerns while helping protect skin from harmful UV rays. This breathable, buildable long-wear body makeup evens skin tone with a natural-looking finish that resists transfer, sweat, and humidity. Infused with hydrating ingredients, this balm moisturizes and strengthens skin barrier repair function Formulated with true-to-tone pigments, it delivers water-resistant wear that stays comfortable for up to 16 hours when set with our Loose Setting Powder.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Dermablend Leg and Body Makeup", "topic": "Manufacturer's own product description for liquid body foundation covering tattoos and scars", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "Consumer product", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_exif_visual_identifiers", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Tattoos, reflections and background details as visual identifiers in shared photos — Proton privacy guidance", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own published guidance states that beyond faces, photos may expose identity through tattoos, jewelry, distinctive clothing, reflections in mirrors and windows, and background elements including screens, documents, ID badges, wall clocks and calendar dates.", "body": "Proton's own published guidance states that beyond faces, photos may expose identity through tattoos, jewelry, distinctive clothing, reflections in mirrors and windows, and background elements including screens, documents, ID badges, wall clocks and calendar dates.\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“Beyond faces, your photos may contain subtle visual clues that can be used to identify people, places, or events: Street signs, license plates, or recognizable landmarks can reveal locations. Tattoos, jewelry, distinctive clothing, or reflections in mirrors and windows can expose identities. Background elements like screens, documents, schedules, or ID badges may contain sensitive information. Wall clocks, calendar dates, or smartwatch displays can pinpoint when a photo was taken.”\n\nNote: Source also advises: 'Take time to review the entire frame before you share any image. Cropping, blurring, or redacting parts of the photo can go a long way in protecting privacy and safeguarding the people depicted.'", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/exif-data", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "Beyond faces, your photos may contain subtle visual clues that can be used to identify people, places, or events: Street signs, license plates, or recognizable landmarks can reveal locations. Tattoos, jewelry, distinctive clothing, or reflections in mirrors and windows can expose identities. Background elements like screens, documents, schedules, or ID badges may contain sensitive information. Wall clocks, calendar dates, or smartwatch displays can pinpoint when a photo was taken.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "EXIF metadata / photo privacy", "topic": "Tattoos, reflections and background details as visual identifiers in shared photos — Proton privacy guidance", "applies_to_country": "*", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_exif_gps_disable_iphone", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] EXIF metadata / photo privacy: How to disable GPS location tagging on iPhone — Proton's own instructions", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own published guidance instructs iPhone users to disable camera GPS tagging via Settings → Privacy & Security → Location Services → Camera → Never.", "body": "Proton's own published guidance instructs iPhone users to disable camera GPS tagging via Settings → Privacy & Security → Location Services → Camera → Never.\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“On iPhone, go to Settings → Privacy & Security → Location Services → Camera and tap Never.”\n\nNote: Volatility medium because iOS menu paths can change between OS versions.", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/exif-data", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "On iPhone, go to Settings → Privacy & Security → Location Services → Camera and tap Never.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "EXIF metadata / photo privacy", "topic": "How to disable GPS location tagging on iPhone — Proton's own instructions", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "iOS devices", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_exif_gps_disable_android", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] EXIF metadata / photo privacy: How to disable GPS location tagging on Android — Proton's own instructions", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own published guidance instructs Android users to disable camera GPS tagging by opening the Camera app, going to Settings, and toggling off Location tag.", "body": "Proton's own published guidance instructs Android users to disable camera GPS tagging by opening the Camera app, going to Settings, and toggling off Location tag.\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“On Android, open the Camera app, go to Settings, and toggle off Location tag.”\n\nNote: Android camera UI varies by manufacturer; menu path may differ.", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/exif-data", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "On Android, open the Camera app, go to Settings, and toggle off Location tag.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "EXIF metadata / photo privacy", "topic": "How to disable GPS location tagging on Android — Proton's own instructions", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "Android devices", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_exif_removal_windows", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] How to remove EXIF data on Windows — Proton's own instructions", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own guidance states that on Windows a user can strip EXIF data by right-clicking the photo, going to Properties → Details, clicking 'Remove Properties and Personal Information', and selecting 'Create a copy with all possible properties removed'.", "body": "Proton's own guidance states that on Windows a user can strip EXIF data by right-clicking the photo, going to Properties → Details, clicking 'Remove Properties and Personal Information', and selecting 'Create a copy with all possible properties removed'.\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“On Windows, right-click a photo, go to Properties → Details, click Remove Properties and Personal Information, and then select Create a copy with all possible properties removed.”", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/exif-data", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "On Windows, right-click a photo, go to Properties → Details, click Remove Properties and Personal Information, and then select Create a copy with all possible properties removed.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "EXIF metadata / photo privacy", "topic": "How to remove EXIF data on Windows — Proton's own instructions", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "Windows OS", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "thin_body", "source_unverifiable:fetch_failed:budget" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_exif_removal_mobile", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] How to remove EXIF data on Mac, iOS and Android — Proton's own instructions", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own guidance states that Mac, iOS and Android have no built-in EXIF remover and require third-party apps: ExifTool (Mac), Scrambled Exif (Android), ViewExif (iOS).", "body": "Proton's own guidance states that Mac, iOS and Android have no built-in EXIF remover and require third-party apps: ExifTool (Mac), Scrambled Exif (Android), ViewExif (iOS).\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“Mac, iOS, and Android don't have a built-in EXIF data remover, so you must use dedicated, third-party apps — such as ExifTool for Mac, Scrambled Exif for Android, and ViewExif for iOS.”\n\nNote: App availability may change.", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/exif-data", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "Mac, iOS, and Android don't have a built-in EXIF data remover, so you must use dedicated, third-party apps — such as ExifTool for Mac, Scrambled Exif for Android, and ViewExif for iOS.", "volatility": "medium", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "EXIF metadata / photo privacy", "topic": "How to remove EXIF data on Mac, iOS and Android — Proton's own instructions", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "Mac, iOS, Android", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "thin_body", "source_unverifiable:fetch_failed:budget" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_exif_filename_risk", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Filename as residual identifier after EXIF removal — Proton's own warning", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own guidance warns that even after EXIF removal, Android device filenames embed the exact date and time of capture (e.g. IMG_20250723_103045.jpg) and advises renaming files to neutral names before sharing.", "body": "Proton's own guidance warns that even after EXIF removal, Android device filenames embed the exact date and time of capture (e.g. IMG_20250723_103045.jpg) and advises renaming files to neutral names before sharing.\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“Even after removing EXIF data, the file name itself can still reveal information about a photo. For instance, Android includes the exact date and time the photo was taken in the file name — such as IMG_20250723_103045.jpg, which corresponds to July 23, 2025, 10:30:45 AM. WhatsApp makes things clearer by using file names like WhatsApp Image 2025-07-22 at 12.38.36 AM. When sharing sensitive or personal photos, rename the files before sending or uploading them using neutral, non-descriptive names like photo1.jpg or image_001.png.”", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/exif-data", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "Even after removing EXIF data, the file name itself can still reveal information about a photo. For instance, Android includes the exact date and time the photo was taken in the file name — such as IMG_20250723_103045.jpg, which corresponds to July 23, 2025, 10:30:45 AM. WhatsApp makes things clearer by using file names like WhatsApp Image 2025-07-22 at 12.38.36 AM. When sharing sensitive or personal photos, rename the files before sending or uploading them using neutral, non-descriptive names like photo1.jpg or image_001.png.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "EXIF metadata / photo privacy", "topic": "Filename as residual identifier after EXIF removal — Proton's own warning", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "Android devices primarily; general principle applies broadly", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "thin_body", "source_unverifiable:fetch_failed:budget" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_protest_tattoo_identification", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Tattoo identification / AI monitoring: Federal agency use of AI to identify individuals via tattoos in social-media photos — Proton's own published statement", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own published guidance states that in 2026 federal agencies use AI-driven social media monitoring that can identify individuals through facial recognition, unique tattoos, or metadata embedded in shared photos.", "body": "Proton's own published guidance states that in 2026 federal agencies use AI-driven social media monitoring that can identify individuals through facial recognition, unique tattoos, or metadata embedded in shared photos.\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“In 2026, federal agencies use AI-driven social media monitoring to scrape protest photos and videos. These tools can identify you or your friends through facial recognition, unique tattoos, or even the metadata hidden in your files. To preserve your privacy, be mindful of the information you share about yourself and the protest in general. If you do take pictures, ensure that all faces and identifying features are blurred or covered first.”\n\nNote: Proton is a privacy-products vendor; the claim about agency capabilities is asserted without a linked primary citation on this page. Confidence medium for the agency-capability claim; the general principle (tattoos are visually identifying) is well-supported across multiple sources.", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/how-to-protect-privacy-at-protests", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "In 2026, federal agencies use AI-driven social media monitoring to scrape protest photos and videos. These tools can identify you or your friends through facial recognition, unique tattoos, or even the metadata hidden in your files. To preserve your privacy, be mindful of the information you share about yourself and the protest in general. If you do take pictures, ensure that all faces and identifying features are blurred or covered first.", "volatility": "high", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Tattoo identification / AI monitoring", "topic": "Federal agency use of AI to identify individuals via tattoos in social-media photos — Proton's own published statement", "applies_to_country": "US", "applies_to_scope": "Context is US federal agencies; general principle applies where similar monitoring exists", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "us" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_protest_pixelation_warning", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Pixelation as insufficient redaction method — Proton's own warning", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own published guidance warns that pixelation can be undone and that solid black boxes or opaque digital stickers are more secure for hiding faces and identifying features.", "body": "Proton's own published guidance warns that pixelation can be undone and that solid black boxes or opaque digital stickers are more secure for hiding faces and identifying features.\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“Pixelation can sometimes be undone, so covering faces with solid black boxes or opaque digital stickers is a much more secure way to protect identities.”", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/how-to-protect-privacy-at-protests", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "Pixelation can sometimes be undone, so covering faces with solid black boxes or opaque digital stickers is a much more secure way to protect identities.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Photo redaction / identity protection", "topic": "Pixelation as insufficient redaction method — Proton's own warning", "applies_to_country": "*", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "thin_body", "source_unverifiable:fetch_failed:budget" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_proton_protest_screenshot_metadata", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Screenshots as partial but not complete metadata-stripping method — Proton's own note", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Proton's own guidance notes that screenshots do not carry the original GPS metadata but may still contain device metadata such as time of capture or phone model.", "body": "Proton's own guidance notes that screenshots do not carry the original GPS metadata but may still contain device metadata such as time of capture or phone model.\n\nWhat Proton AG actually says:\n\n“Taking a screenshot is a popular way to hide data, because they do not carry the original GPS metadata. However, screenshots may still contain metadata from your device, such as the time of the capture or your phone's model.”", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://proton.me/blog/how-to-protect-privacy-at-protests", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Proton AG", "evidence_quote": "Taking a screenshot is a popular way to hide data, because they do not carry the original GPS metadata. However, screenshots may still contain metadata from your device, such as the time of the capture or your phone's model.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Photo metadata / screenshot residual data", "topic": "Screenshots as partial but not complete metadata-stripping method — Proton's own note", "applies_to_country": "*", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "thin_body", "source_unverifiable:fetch_failed:budget" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_bellingcat_geolocation_reflections_background", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] OSINT / photo geolocation: Background and window-reflection details used to geolocate a photograph to a specific building — Bellingcat case study", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] Bellingcat's published investigation demonstrated that a group photograph with no available EXIF data was geolocated to a specific Russian Ministry of Defence facility using background details including brick wall pattern, roof design, stair configuration, floor cracks, and reflections of windows visible in glass behind the subjects.", "body": "Bellingcat's published investigation demonstrated that a group photograph with no available EXIF data was geolocated to a specific Russian Ministry of Defence facility using background details including brick wall pattern, roof design, stair configuration, floor cracks, and reflections of windows visible in glass behind the subjects.\n\nWhat Bellingcat actually says:\n\n“The micro-details help us make a positive identification of the site once we find a potential match, such as cracks in a floor, paint patterns on building columns, the design of a no-smoking sign and so on.”\n\nNote: Secondary quote establishing the reflection method: 'A close-up of the photo background shows the reflection of a white wall or columns in a window behind where the photo was taken.' No EXIF was available; identification was achieved entirely from visual background content. Directly illustrates the risk that a room's background — including reflections — can pinpoint a location.", "source_type": "research", "source_link": "https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2022/10/28/how-we-geolocated-a-photo-of-a-russian-missile-programming-team/", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "STRONG PRACTICE", "source_tier": "B", "source_publisher": "Bellingcat", "evidence_quote": "The micro-details help us make a positive identification of the site once we find a potential match, such as cracks in a floor, paint patterns on building columns, the design of a no-smoking sign and so on.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "OSINT / photo geolocation", "topic": "Background and window-reflection details used to geolocate a photograph to a specific building — Bellingcat case study", "applies_to_country": "*", "applies_to_scope": "Case involved Moscow facility; method is universally applicable", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_reddit_opsec_adult_performer_background_staging", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Adult performer deliberately staging misleading background details to misdirect tracking attempts — first-person account", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] A creator posting in r/opsec (December 2020) described sanitising photos of identifiable information and deliberately placing misleading background details to send potential trackers to a false location.", "body": "A creator posting in r/opsec (December 2020) described sanitising photos of identifiable information and deliberately placing misleading background details to send potential trackers to a false location.\n\nWhat Reddit r/opsec actually says:\n\n“I do have my photos sanitized for identifiable information. I even staged a few pieces of misinformation in the background that look innocent, so if somebody tries to track me down using that, they'll be chasing a wild goose”\n\nNote: Quote from search-result snippet only; full page returned HTTP 403. Content is internally consistent and corroborated by other sources in this batch. Treat quote as approximate pending direct page access.", "source_type": "community", "source_link": "https://www.reddit.com/r/opsec/comments/kbamcu/adult_performer_opsec/", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "CREATOR STRATEGY", "source_tier": "C", "source_publisher": "Reddit r/opsec", "evidence_quote": "I do have my photos sanitized for identifiable information. I even staged a few pieces of misinformation in the background that look innocent, so if somebody tries to track me down using that, they'll be chasing a wild goose", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Creator OPSEC / background staging", "topic": "Adult performer deliberately staging misleading background details to misdirect tracking attempts — first-person account", "applies_to_country": "*", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_reddit_opsec_adult_performer_exif_strip", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Adult performer recommending EXIF/metadata stripping before sharing photos — first-person advice in r/opsec thread", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] A commenter in the r/opsec adult-performer thread (December 2020) recommended stripping EXIF/metadata before sending photos and cited verexif.com as a tool to view and delete embedded image data.", "body": "A commenter in the r/opsec adult-performer thread (December 2020) recommended stripping EXIF/metadata before sending photos and cited verexif.com as a tool to view and delete embedded image data.\n\nWhat Reddit r/opsec actually says:\n\n“Stripping EXIF/metadata is a great idea before sending photos (https://www.verexif.com/en/ for example, can show what sort of data is stored on your images and also lets you delete them)”\n\nNote: Quote from search-result snippet only; full page returned HTTP 403. Treat as approximate pending direct access.", "source_type": "community", "source_link": "https://www.reddit.com/r/opsec/comments/kbamcu/adult_performer_opsec/", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "CREATOR STRATEGY", "source_tier": "C", "source_publisher": "Reddit r/opsec", "evidence_quote": "Stripping EXIF/metadata is a great idea before sending photos (https://www.verexif.com/en/ for example, can show what sort of data is stored on your images and also lets you delete them)", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Creator OPSEC / EXIF removal", "topic": "Adult performer recommending EXIF/metadata stripping before sharing photos — first-person advice in r/opsec thread", "applies_to_country": "*", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_reddit_opsec_adult_performer_2024_no_tattoos", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Adult creator pre-emptively avoiding tattoos and piercings to remain visually generic — first-person account", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] A creator posting in r/opsec (April 2024) stated as a deliberate identity-protection measure that they were avoiding tattoos, piercings, and anything else that would easily identify them.", "body": "A creator posting in r/opsec (April 2024) stated as a deliberate identity-protection measure that they were avoiding tattoos, piercings, and anything else that would easily identify them.\n\nWhat Reddit r/opsec actually says:\n\n“Physically, I'm trying to make myself as generic-looking as possible; no tattoos, no piercings, nothing that would easily identify me. I can keep my face hidden for the most part as well.”\n\nNote: Quote from search-result snippet only; full page returned HTTP 403. Treat as approximate pending direct access.", "source_type": "community", "source_link": "https://www.reddit.com/r/opsec/comments/1c24kit/protecting_my_identity_as_an_adult_performer/", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "CREATOR STRATEGY", "source_tier": "C", "source_publisher": "Reddit r/opsec", "evidence_quote": "Physically, I'm trying to make myself as generic-looking as possible; no tattoos, no piercings, nothing that would easily identify me. I can keep my face hidden for the most part as well.", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Creator OPSEC / physical identifiers", "topic": "Adult creator pre-emptively avoiding tattoos and piercings to remain visually generic — first-person account", "applies_to_country": "*", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } }, { "id": "learn_r76_marks_and_surroundings_76_reddit_opsec_adult_performer_2024_makeup_wig", "category": "Safety", "title": "[Unverified - being checked] Makeup, wigs and accessories recommended to differ in-work vs everyday appearance — first-person practitioner advice", "summary": "[Unverified - being checked] A commenter in the r/opsec adult-performer thread (April 2024) advised using makeup, wigs and accessories to look substantially different on camera compared to everyday life.", "body": "A commenter in the r/opsec adult-performer thread (April 2024) advised using makeup, wigs and accessories to look substantially different on camera compared to everyday life.\n\nWhat Reddit r/opsec actually says:\n\n“Use makeup, wigs, accessories, etc. to look very different at work and in everyday life”\n\nNote: Quote from search-result snippet only; full page returned HTTP 403. Treat as approximate pending direct access.", "source_type": "community", "source_link": "https://www.reddit.com/r/opsec/comments/1c24kit/protecting_my_identity_as_an_adult_performer/", "last_verified": "2026-09-03", "reliability": "CREATOR STRATEGY", "source_tier": "C", "source_publisher": "Reddit r/opsec", "evidence_quote": "Use makeup, wigs, accessories, etc. to look very different at work and in everyday life", "volatility": "low", "from_batch": "76-marks-and-surroundings", "subject": "Creator OPSEC / appearance alteration", "topic": "Makeup, wigs and accessories recommended to differ in-work vs everyday appearance — first-person practitioner advice", "applies_to_country": "*", "tags": { "lane": "any", "stage": "any", "region": [ "any" ], "platform": "any", "topic": [ "unclassified" ], "explicitness": "any" }, "verification": { "status": "unverified", "label": "Unverified - being checked", "reasons": [ "legal_fetch_over_cap" ], "checked_utc": "20261021-123916Z" } } ] }